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Abstract—This paper demonstrates that false data injection
(FDI) attacks are extremely limited in their ability to cause
physical consequences on N − 1 reliable power systems oper-
ating with real-time contingency analysis (RTCA) and security
constrained economic dispatch (SCED). Prior work has shown
that FDI attacks can be designed via an attacker-defender bi-
level linear program (ADBLP) to cause physical overflows after
re-dispatch using DCOPF. In this paper, it is shown that attacks
designed using DCOPF fail to cause overflows on N − 1 reliable
systems because the system response modeled is inaccurate. An
ADBLP that accurately models the system response is proposed
to find the worst-case physical consequences, thereby modeling a
strong attacker with system level knowledge. Simulation results
on the synthetic Texas system with 2000 buses show that even
with the new enhanced attacks, for systems operated conser-
vatively due to N − 1 constraints, the designed attacks only
lead to post-contingency overflows. Moreover, the attacker must
control a large portion of measurements and physically create a
contingency in the system to cause consequences. Therefore, it
is conceivable but requires an extremely sophisticated attacker
to cause physical consequences on N − 1 reliable power systems
operated with RTCA and SCED.
Index Terms—False data injection attack, cyber-security, vul-
nerability of N − 1 reliable power systems, bi-level optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
The efficiency and intelligence of modern electric power
systems are increasing rapidly with integration of real-time
monitoring, sensing, communication and data processing. This
integration is accomplished via a cyber layer consisting of
the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system
in conjunction with the energy management system (EMS).
SCADA monitors the physical system, collects measurements,
and sends them to the control center. In the EMS, state esti-
mation (SE) estimates the voltage magnitudes and angles from
measurements. This estimate along with the subsequent data
processing, optimization and communication, specifically real-
time contingency analysis (RTCA) [1] and security constrained
economic dispatch (SCED) [2], allow for real-time control of
the power systems.
However, the integration of the cyber layer also increases
the threat of cyber-attacks on power systems that could lead
to severe physical consequences, as illustrated by the recent
cyber-attack in Ukraine (see [3]). Therefore, it is crucial to
develop techniques to detect and thwart potential attacks,
which requires evaluating system vulnerability to credible at-
tacks. Assessing consequences of possible attacks is extremely
instructive for system operators, and is important for secure
power system operations.
Related work: This paper focuses on unobservable false
data injection (FDI) attacks, wherein a malicious attacker
replaces a subset of SCADA measurements (power flows
and injections) with counterfeits. A wealth of research effort
has been undertaken on FDI attacks, showing that they can
be designed to target system states [4]–[6], system topology
[7], [8], and energy markets [9]. They can bypass the bad
data detector (BDD) embedded within SE, and change the
load data used for re-dispatch, which in turn cause physical
and/or economic consequences. Many existing work eval-
uating the worst-case attack consequences involve solving
attacker-defender bi-level linear programs (ADBLPs), wherein
the first level models the attacker’s objective and limitations
(e.g., number of measurements to change), while the second
level models the system response under attack via DC optimal
power flow (OPF). Examples include attacks that cause line
overflows [10], locational marginal price (LMP) changes [11],
operating cost increases [12] and sequential outages [13]. The
authors of [14] analyzes the physical consequences when the
attacker only has limited information, and [15] and [16] focus
on cyber-physical coordinated attacks. The authors of [17]
propose an ADBLP to find FDI attacks that add or drop
contingency pairs with minimum attack effort, and analyze
the economic effect of such attacks on LMPs. Rahman et al.
[18] demonstrate several case studies to showcase the impact
of FDI attacks on contingency analysis, but their approach is
not optimization-based, which means that it does not consider
worst-case scenarios. Both [17] and [18] consider simplified
SCED as system response, but the only addition of their SCED
to DCOPF is the contingency case line power flow constraints
modeled using DC line outage distribution factors (LODFs),
while other SCED constraints such as reserve and ramp rate
constraints are not considered.
Despite this prior research, there remains a need to evaluate
physical consequences of FDI attacks that take into account
detailed models for the system response, including RTCA
and SCED. To understand the worst case consequences, we
evaluate the vulnerability of N −1 reliable power systems, by
modeling a powerful attacker that has system level knowledge
and capabilities. In particular, we focus on unobservable
FDI attacks that aim to maximize the power flow on a
target line after re-dispatch [10]. The authors of [10] design
such attacks by solving an ADBLP modeling DCOPF as
the system response and demonstrate that they can cause
physical overflows. However, we found in our experiments
that these attacks fail to cause overflows on systems operating
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with RTCA and SCED. This observation leads to another
question: can attacks designed with complete knowledge of
operations lead to more consequences? Note that answering
this question inherently focuses on very strong attackers, as in
general there is no universally adopted formulation of SCED,
and we assume the attacker knows the SCED formulation
for the particular system that it is attacking. Our goal of
modeling such strong attackers is to understand if the grid is
resilient to such worst-case attacks. The resulting attacks are
tested on the synthetic Texas system [19] with 2000 buses to
demonstrate the difficulty of causing physical consequences.
Our results show that N − 1 reliability achieved by RTCA
and SCED leads to more conservative operation, making it
hard for FDI attacks to cause any pre-contingency overflows,
even for the above-mentioned strong attacker. The attacks may
still cause post-contingency overflows, but this requires the
attacker to perform a cyber-physical coordinated attack by
physically creating a contingency. Furthermore, as we show
later, these sophisticated attacks also require the attacker to
control measurements in a large portion of the system, which
is again difficult to achieve in practice.
To summarize, the key contributions of this paper are as
follows:
1. We showcase that attacks designed without considering
EMS operations including RTCA and SCED do not cause the
physical consequences intended by the attacker.
2. Given this observation, we propose an ADBLP modeling
SCED as the system response, assuming an extremely strong
attacker who has perfect knowledge of EMS operations in-
cluding RTCA and SCED.
3. We provide simulation results on the synthetic Texas
system with 2000 buses. We find that the resulting attacks
can only cause post-contingency overflows.
4. We highlight that even the aforementioned powerful
attacker must control a large number of measurements and
physically create a contingency to cause overflows.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec. II
describes the power system measurement model and unobserv-
able attack model. Sec. III demonstrates that attacks designed
with DCOPF are extremely limited in their ability to have
expected consequences if the system re-dispatch using RTCA
and SCED. Sec. IV details the knowledge and capabilities of
the worst-case attacker, and introduces an ADBLP modeling
SCED as system response to find worst-case attacks. Sec. V
illustrates the simulation results on the synthetic Texas system.
Concluding remarks and future work are presented in Sec. VI.
II. SYSTEM AND ATTACK MODEL
A. EMS Operation
In this paper, we consider an EMS with three core functions
operating in the order of SE, RTCA, and SCED. The EMS
operating structure is illustrated in Fig. 1. Power system
measurement data collected by SCADA are sent to SE, which
estimates the complex voltages after eliminating noise and
bad measurements. Given the generator set points, load values
are estimated based on SE results. Modern power systems
typically require N−1 reliability, i.e., the system must operate
with no violations if a contingency occurs (one of the system
components, generators or branches, is out of service). RTCA
simulates one power flow under each contingency k. We say
a branch has a warning if its power flow is above a threshold
τ but less than its limit, while a branch has a violation if its
power flow exceeds its limit. Both “warning” and “violation”
branches are denoted critical branches. For post-contingency
critical branches, their corresponding contingencies are called
critical contingencies. Note that in base case, the branch
limits are the long-term ratings, while in contingency case
they are the short-term ratings. RTCA generates one security
constraint to be modeled in SCED for each warning and
violation. SCED takes all security constraints, along with
other common constraints including reserve and ramp rates,
to solves an optimization problem to determine the most
economic generation dispatch that ensures N − 1 reliability.
SCADA 
State 
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Physical 
System 
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Fig. 1: EMS operation with SE, RTCA, and SCED.
B. Measurement Model
We model the power system with nb buses, ng generators,
and nm measurements. The SCADA system measurement
model is given by
z = h(x) + e (1)
where z is the nm × 1 measurement vector; x is the 2nb × 1
vector of bus voltage magnitudes and angles (states); h(·) is
the non-linear relationship between measurements and states;
e is the nm × 1 vector of measurement noise, whose entries
are assumed to be jointly distributed as N (0,R) where R =
diag(σ21 , σ
2
2 , . . . , σ
2
nm).
C. Unobservable Attack Model
An nm × 1 false measurement vector z¯ is defined to be
unobservable to the traditional residual-based BDD if
z¯ = h(x+ c) + e, (2)
where c is the attack vector [6]. These false measurements
cannot be distinguished from the true measurements if the true
states are x+c, and hence, cannot be detected by the traditional
BDD. Given c, an attack subgraph S can be constructed as in
[6], such that the non-zero entries of z¯ − z are all within S.
Launching such an attack requires the attacker to gain control
of all measurements within S. By modifying measurements in
S, the attacker can arbitrarily spoof the states of center buses
(load buses corresponding to non-zero entries of c) without
detection. The attack causes the system estimated loads to re-
distribute between load buses within S, while the total load
remain unchanged.
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III. CONSEQUENCES OF ATTACKS DESIGNED WITH
DCOPF ON N − 1 RELIABLE SYSTEM
In this section, we demonstrate that attacks designed without
considering RTCA and SCED (as in many existing literatures)
do not cause expected physical consequences on systems
operated as outlined in Fig. 1. The attacker’s capability as-
sumptions and the attack design ADBLP are adopted from
[10]. The purpose of the attacker is to maximize the physical
power flow on a target line after re-dispatch, and possibly
cause overflow. The attacker is assumed to have knowledge of:
(i) the complete network topology (including line parameters
and ratings) and load information, and (ii) the cost, capacity,
and operational status of all generators in the system. The
formulation of this ADBLP is given by
maximize
c
Pl − σ ‖c‖1 (3a)
subject to
‖c‖1 ≤ N1 (3b)
− LSPD ≤ Hc ≤ LSPD (3c)
Pl = PTDFl(GBP ∗G − PD) (3d)
{P ∗G} = arg
{
min
PG
CG (PG)
}
(3e)
subject to∑ng
g=1 PGg =
∑nb
i=1 PDi (3f)
−Pmax ≤ PTDF(GBPG − PD +Hc) ≤ Pmax (3g)
PG,min ≤ PG ≤ PG,max (3h)
where the variables are:
c attack vector, nb × 1;
Pl physical power flow on target line l;
PG power output of generators, ng × 1;
and the parameters are:
σ penalty of the l1-norm of attack vector c;
GB generators to buses connectivity matrix, nb × ng;
N1 attack vector l1-norm limit;
LS load shift factor, in percentage;
H dependency matrix between power injection mea-
surements and states, nb × nb;
PD vector of real loads, nb × 1;
CG generation cost vector, ng × 1;
PTDF power transfer distribution factor matrix;
PTDFl the lth row of PTDF matrix;
Pmax vector of base case line limits;
PG,min generation lower limits vector, ng × 1;
PG,max generation upper limits vector, ng × 1.
In DCOPF, the voltage magnitudes are all considered to
be 1 p.u., and hence, c is an nb × 1 attack vector on the
voltage angles. The objective function (3a) is to maximize
the physical power flow on target line l, and the second term
penalizes the l1-norm of attack vector c, such that if there
exists multiple optimal solutions, the one with the smallest
‖c‖1 will be selected. Constraint (3b) limits the attacker’s
resources. Ideally, this should be characterized by the number
of states that can be changed by the attacker, which is the l0-
norm of c. However, l0-norm is non-convex and intractable,
here we use l1-norm as a proxy. (3d) calculates physical
power flows from the optimal generation dispatch under attack.
(3c) characterize the detectability of the attacks in terms of
load shift, because loads that deviating too much from their
true values are easily detectable. Note that Hc is a DC
approximation of the injection measurement changes caused
by the attack, because the AC relationship h(·) is non-convex.
(3e)-(3h) are DCOPF under attack. It is illustrated in [10]
that the attacks obtained by solving (3) can cause physical
overflows if the system re-dispatches using DCOPF.
However, modern EMSs typically operate as outlined in
Fig. 1. Thus, the attacker cannot accurately predict the system
response by solving (3), and the re-dispatch after attack may
not cause expected consequences. We have found in our
experiments that attacks designed with DCOPF cannot cause
any overflows on the synthetic Texas system operating with
RTCA and SCED even in the peak load scenario. To illustrate
this, consider the following example from our experiments.
The attacker continuously monitors the system operating
status, and at the peak load hour, it observes that the most
critical branch is transformer “tx-3083-3082” with a power
flow of 76.72%. It selects this branch as the target and uses (3)
(that is, modeling the system response via DCOPF) to obtain
the attack vector c as well as the predicted physical power flow.
It finds that the predicted flow exceeds the rating. Hence, it
creates false measurements z¯ = h(xˆ+ c) to launch an attack.
The system estimates loads from z¯, and performs RTCA and
SCED to find the optimal generation dispatch (details of RTCA
and SCED are given in Sec. IV-B). Applying the new dispatch
on the real loads yields the actual physical power flows. Fig.
2 illustrates a comparison between the attacker’s predicted
physical power flows and the actual flows on this target branch
as a function of load shifts LS , with N1 = 2.
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Fig. 2: Consequence of attacks designed with DCOPF on
N − 1 reliable synthetic Texas system, N1 = 2.
From this figure, we can see that the attacker predicted
power flows exceed the rating of the branch for every load
shift, but the actual flows are not affected. This is because in
the pre-attack DCOPF solution, the target branch is congested.
The attack redistributes the loads in the system, making it
appear that the flow on this branch is reduced. The higher
the load shift, the more the reduction on the flow. Thus,
DCOPF will re-dispatch the generations to increase the flow
on this branch, making it congested again. This will overload
the branch in the physical system, since the real loads are
not changed. However, SCED models more constraints than
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DCOPF does, and this branch is congested in neither base case
nor contingency cases. The load redistribution caused by the
attack does not affect any binding constraints in SCED, and
hence, has no effect on the re-dispatch. We have experimented
on the 5 branches with highest base case flows, and observed
similar consequences.
IV. WORST-CASE ATTACKS
A. Attacker Assumptions
The observations illustrated in the previous section lead to
the following new question: if the attacker knows the system
operation details, can it cause physical consequences through
FDI attacks? To this end, we model the worst-case attacker
who has knowledge of system EMS operations. In other words,
the attacker is able to perform the same RTCA and SCED as
the system does, and hence, can design attacks that maximize
the consequences. This is a very strong assumption, because
in addition to having access to the database of the control
center, now the attacker further knows the algorithms and
assumptions used by the system. While this assumption may
be impractical, we aim to understand whether N − 1 reliable
system is resilient against such strong adversaries through this
worst-case approach.
In order to accurately predict the system response under
attack, the attacker needs to know all the constraints modeled
in SCED. This requires the attacker to gain knowledge of the
power flow algorithm used in RTCA to get the same post-
contingency flows on all branches, as well as the threshold τ
as described in Sec. II, to determine the security constraints to
be included in SCED. In addition to these security constraints,
the attacker must know the detailed modeling of other SCED
constraints, as different systems may have different SCED
implementations. We assume the attacker has full knowledge
of RTCA and SCED implementations, in particular:
1) Contingency ratings of the branches;
2) Loss handling method;
3) Ramp rates and reserve costs of all generators;
4) Reserve policy and requirements;
5) Criteria to determine which base case line limits are to
be modeled. This can be the same threshold as τ in post-
contingency case, but can also be different;
6) Branch flow calculation method in both base case and
contingency case;
7) Load shedding policy and costs.
Although it is not entirely impossible to have this level of
knowledges [20], since such complex attacks often involve
sophisticated (even nation-state) attackers that can exploit or
have access to insider knowledge [3], [21], it is still extremely
hard to have such a strong attacker in practice. However, this is
the worst-case assumptions from the optimization perspective,
because the attacker can most accurately predict the system
response by modeling exactly same SCED. Modeling less con-
straints or relaxing any of those constraints will increase the
feasible region of SCED, and hence, exaggerate the attacker
predicted consequences. Understanding the vulnerability of
power system to such worst-case attacks can serve as an upper
bound on risks to system operations.
B. ADBLP to Find Worst-case Attacks
The worst-case line overflow attacks can be found using an
ADBLP similar to (3). The first level models the attacker’s
objective and limitations, while the second level models
the system response via SCED. The security constraints are
generated by an RTCA that simulates branch contingencies,
excluding radial branches. Contingency k indicates that branch
k is out of service. The attacker can choose critical branches in
either base case or contingency case as target branch. Without
loss of generality, we assume the flow on l is positive; if it is
not the case, its absolute value can be maximized.
The ADBLP takes the following form:
maximize
c
Pl − σ ‖c‖1 or Pl,kt − σ‖c‖1 (4a)
subject to
‖c‖1 ≤ N1 (4b)
− LSPD ≤ Hc ≤ LSPD (4c)
Pl = PTDFl(GBP ∗G − PD) (4d)
Pl,kt = OTDF
l
kt(GBP
∗
G − PD) (4e)
{P ∗G} = arg
{
min
PG,RG,P,Pk
CG (PG) + CRRG
}
(4f)
subject to∑ng
g=1 PGg =
∑nb
i=1 PDi (4g)
P¯ = P0 + PTDF(GB(PG − PG0) +Hc) (4h)
P¯k = Pk0 + OTDFk(GB(PG − PG0) +Hc) (4i)
+ LODFk · PTDFk ·Hc, ∀k
− Pmax ≤ P¯ ≤ Pmax (4j)
− Pk,max ≤ P¯k ≤ Pk,max,∀k (4k)
PG ≥ max{PG0 −MGTh, PG,min} (4l)
PG ≤ max{PG0 +MGTh, PG,max} (4m)
0 ≤ RG ≤MGTr (4n)
PG +RG ≤ PG,max (4o)∑ng
g=1RGg ≥ PGg +RGg ,∀g (4p)
In addition to the variables and parameters introduced in (3),
the new notations are listed as follows.
P¯ , P¯k vectors of monitored line cyber power flows in
base case and under contingency k, respectively;
Pl,kt physical power flow on target line l under target
contingency kt;
RG spinning reserve of the generators, ng × 1;
OTDFk outage transfer distribution factor matrix under
contingency k;
OTDFlk l
th row of OTDFk;
CR reserve cost vector, ng × 1;
P0, Pk0 vectors of pre-SCED monitored line power flows
in base case and under contingency k, respec-
tively;
PG0 pre-SCED generator outputs, ng × 1;
PTDFk kth row of PTDF;
LODFk line outage distribution factors of monitored lines
under contingency k;
Pk,max vector of line limits under contingency k;
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MG ramp rates of all generators, ng × 1;
Th look-ahead time for one period SCED;
Tr time for spinning reserve requirement.
The attacker’s limitations (4b)-(4c) are the same as those in
(3). (4d) and (4e) are the physical power flows on line l under
base case and under target contingency kt, respectively. The
second level SCED (4f)-(4p) models the system response to
the attack. The SCED is a linearized approximation of ACOPF,
and we model it in a “hot start” fashion to reduce the AC-DC
discrepancy. The objective of the operator (4f) is to minimize
the total cost, consisting of generation cost and reserve cost;
constraint (4g) is the power balance equation; (4h) is the cyber
power flow of the base case monitored lines. Here P0 is the
vector of base case pre-SCED branch flows obtained from
RTCA, and is non-linearly related to the pre-SCED generation
PG0. Therefore, only the change in base case branch flows,
P¯−P0, are linearly related to the generation change Pg−PG0,
and the AC-DC discrepancy is less than that if this constraint is
modeled as (3g). Note that this constraint is only modeled for
critical lines whose pre-SCED power flow is greater than the
threshold τ , i.e., |P0/Pmax| ≥ τ . This is under the assumption
that the line flows will not change dramatically after the SCED
re-dispatch, due to the ramping constraints of the generators.
Similarly, (4i) is the cyber power flows on monitored lines
under each contingency k, where |Pk0/Pk,max| ≥ τ . Here
we assume the base case and contingency case monitoring
thresholds are the same. In the right hand side of (4i), the first
term is the pre-SCED post-contingency flows; the second term
is the change of the flows as a result of re-dispatch and false
loads; the third term quantifies the amount of power on the
monitored lines resulting from the effect of false loads on the
contingency line k, which is not considered in Pk0. Constraints
(4j) and (4k) are the line limits in base case and contingency
case, respectively. The active power limits in both base case
and contingency cases, Pmax and Pk,max, are approximated
from the MVA ratings and reactive flows on the branches by
Pmax =
√
S2max − [max(Qfrom, Qto)]2 (5)
Pk,max =
√
S2k,max − [max(Qk,from, Qk,to)]2 (6)
where Smax and Sk,max are branch long-term and short-term
ratings, respectively; Qfrom and Qto are the base case reactive
branch flows at the "from" end and "to" end, respectively;
Qk,from and Qk,to are those flows in contingency cases. This
is an additional approach to reduce the AC-DC discrepancy.
Constraints (4l) and (4m) are the ramp rate limits; (4n) is
the reserve limit; (4o) is the generation limit. Though the
RTCA does not simulate generator contingencies, in SCED
it is required that when a generator is out, the reserves of all
other generators are sufficient to cover the output of the lost
generator. This system reserve requirement is captured in (4p).
With knowledge of system RTCA and SCED, the attacker
can wisely select the target branch, so that the constraints
associated with this branch is binding or nearly binding in
the pre-attack SCED solution. Therefore, the false loads can
mislead the SCED to re-dispatch the generation to increase
the flow on the target branch, and possibly cause overflow.
Solving the ADBLP (4) provides the attack vector c and
resulting physical power flows, which allow for evaluating the
vulnerability.
C. Attack Implementation
Fig. 3 illustrates the implementation of the attack and the
vulnerability assessment approach. We assume the attacker
aims to cause post-contingency overflows, and the real loads
remain unchanged during the attack period. The physical
system behavior and the SCADA measurement collection are
simulated by solving an AC power flow. The true measure-
ments z1 from the power flow solution are acquired by the
attacker to estimate the states (denoted xˆ1). It then performs
RTCA to achieve the security constraints and solves the attack
design ADBLP to find the attack vector c. Recall that the
second level of the ADBLP is a SCED in response to the
attack, and by solving it the attacker obtains the predicted
maximal physical power flow on the target branch, which is the
optimal objective P ∗l,kt . To implement the designed attack, the
attacker then constructs false measurements z¯1 = h(xˆ1+c) and
injects z¯1 to the system SE instead of the true measurements
z1. Again, only the measurements in the attack subgraph S are
changed. Since the generator outputs are known to the system,
the false measurements will cause the SE to estimate a set
of false loads. RTCA and SCED are then performed by the
system to determine the new optimal generation dispatch P ∗G
in response to the false loads. Once the generators re-dispatch,
the true measurements changed to z2. To sustain the attack on
the system, the attacker again acquires z2, and estimates the
new states xˆ2. It then sends z¯2 = h(xˆ2 + c) to the system SE
to estimate new false loads. The system operator again runs
RTCA with the new false loads and observes the cyber power
flow P¯l,kt . However, the new dispatch applied on the physical
system, will maximize the physical power flow on target line l
under target contingency kt, and possibly cause overflow. The
true physical power flow, Pl,kt , is obtained by running RTCA
with the new dispatch on real loads.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we present physical consequences through
simulations of the attacks designed using ADBLP (4). We use
the synthetic Texas system with 2000 buses, 3210 branches,
and 432 generators [19]. The base case power flow and
RTCA are performed using OpenPA [22], a Java-based EMS
simulation platform that we developed in collaboration with
our industry partners IncSys [23] and PowerData [24]. Without
attack, the system is operating at steady-state, which means
that SCED does not change the generation dispatch between
each EMS loop. In the base case power flow solution, the total
losses among the system is 2% of the net load. We assume
the SCED handles losses by uniformly increasing all loads by
this percentage. RTCA simulates contingencies of all branches
whose end bus voltages are both at least 100 kV, except radial
branches. The short-term branch limit is assumed to be 115%
of the long-term limit, i.e., Sk,max = 115% × Smax; SCED
look ahead time Th = 15 minutes; spinning reserve time
Tr = 10 minutes. The ADBLP is solved using a Modified
Benders’ decomposition (MBD) algorithm that we introduced
in [25], which can efficiently solve large-scale ADBLPs. With
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Fig. 3: Attack implementation and system vulnerability
assessment approach.
a warning threshold τ = 90%, RTCA reports no base case
critical branches, and 25 post-contingency critical branches
before attack. We exhaustively design attacks targeting each
of those 25 branches for post-contingency overflows with load
shift LS = [10%, 20%], and l1-norm constraint N1 = [0.2, 2]
in steps of 0.2. All simulations are conducted on a 3.4 GHz
PC with 32 GB RAM.
A. Results on Maximal Physical Power Flows
Fig. 4 compares physical power flow P ∗l,kt predicted by the
attacker, the true power flow Pl,kt in the physical system, as
well as the power flow (cyber) seen by the system operator
P¯l,kt , as a function of the l1-norm constraint N1. These power
flows are plotted as percentage values relative to the active
power limit Pl,k,max calculated using (6). The attacker’s goal
is to maximize the power flow on line ‘ln-2025-2055’ when
line ‘ln-2054-5236’ is out of service.
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Fig. 4: Comparison of attacker predicted, physical, and cyber
power flows on line ‘ln-2025-2055’ under contingency
‘ln-2054-5236’, (a) LS = 10%; (b) LS = 20% .
The results indicate that the attacks cause post-contingency
overflows. When the load shift LS = 10%, P ∗l,kt and Pl,kt
increase as N1 increases. When LS = 20%, similar results are
observed, but P ∗l,kt and Pl,kt are not monotonically increas-
ing as N1 increases. This suggests that the MBD algorithm
provides sub-optimal solutions, because as N1 increases, the
constraints are relaxed, and the optimal solution for a larger
N1 should be at least that of a smaller N1. As expected,
maximal physical power flow is higher when a larger load
shift is allowed.
The true physical power flow Pl,kt is slightly lower than
the attacker predicted physical power flow P ∗l,kt . One possible
reason for this phenomenon is that the attacker is solving a
DC approximation of an AC system, and the reactive power
flow may change after attack. This could result in a difference
in Pl,k,max before and after attack. Another possible reason
is that the false measurements z¯1 injected by the attacker
generate a different set of security constraints than those
result from true measurements z. The attacker uses security
constraints generated by pre-attack RTCA to solve the attack
design ADBLP, but those constraints used in system SCED are
based on the false measurements after attack. As a result, the
system SCED solution is different than the attacker predicted
re-dispatch. One approach for the attacker to prevent this
situation is to run its own RTCA using the false measurements
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and include any newly appeared security constraints into the
attack design ADBLP, until there are no more new security
constraints. However, this approach has no convergence guar-
antee, and could be too time-consuming.
Note that in order for the attacks to actually cause post-
contingency violations requires a particular contingency to
occur. Thus, the attacker has to physically create the target
contingency itself, otherwise it has to wait for the contingency
to occur. If the attacker is sufficiently powerful to physically
cause contingencies, it may trip multiple lines to shut down the
system, and there is no need for cyber-attacks in this situation.
As far as we know, the probability of line failure is pretty
low in practice. Thus, even though the attacks can cause post-
contingency overflows, they can only put the system into an
insecure state rather than cause physical damages, because of
the difficulty in creating contingencies.
In the synthetic Texas system, there is no branch whose
base case power flow is higher than τ prior to the attack.
Thus, to cause base case overflow, the attacker has to shift a
tremendous amount of load that may easily trigger an alarm
at the control center. We have attempted to design a base case
attack targeting top 5 branches with the highest base case
power flow in percentage, but no overflow can be found even
with LS = 90% and N1 = 20. This indicates that RTCA and
SCED push the system to operate conservatively, which in turn
decreases the vulnerability to line overflow attacks.
B. Results on Attack Resources
Fig. 5 illustrates the relationship between maximal power
flow and l0-norm of the attack vector (i.e. the number of center
buses in the attack) versus the l1-norm constraint N1 for target
line ‘ln-2025-2055’ under contingency ‘ln-2054-5236’, with
different load shift constraints. As N1 increases, so does the l0-
norm of the attack, indicating that l1-norm is a valid proxy for
l0-norm for our problem. If a larger load shift is allowed, the
maximal power flow on target line increases, but the resulting
l0-norm may decrease for the same N1. This indicates a trade-
off between load shift and attacker’s resources: as the attacker
attempts to avoid detection by minimizing load changes, it will
require control over a larger portion of the system to launch a
comparable attack. These results also indicate that the attacker
needs a tremendous amount of resources to launch the attacks.
For example, with LS = 10% and N1 = 1, the attacker needs
to change the state of 250 load buses. The corresponding attack
subgraph S contains more than 800 buses, which is almost half
the system. Thus, the attacker must control measurements in
almost half of the system to successfully launch this attack,
which is extremely hard to achieve.
C. Comparison of Physical and Cyber RTCA results
Fig. 6 compares the physical and cyber RTCA results after
the re-dispatch resulting from an attack on target line ‘ln-
2025-2055’ under contingency ‘ln-2054-5236’ with load shift
LS = 10%, N1 = 2. The cyber post-contingency power flows
on the x-axis represent what the system operator observes,
while the y-axis represents the post-contingency power flows
in the physical system. There is no point beyond 100% of the
x-axis, which indicates that the system operator sees no post-
contingency violation after the attack. Therefore, the attack
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
Fig. 5: Comparison of the l0-norm of the attack vector for
target line ‘ln-2025-2055’ under contingency ‘ln-2054-5236’.
successfully spoofed the operator that the system is in a
secure state, while in reality, the target line has a 112.2%
post-contingency overflow. In addition, there are four post-
contingency violations that are caused by the same attack,
even though they are not the attacker’s targets, but the overflow
percentage are less. This observation indicates that the attack
does put the system into an insecure state, and the system is
no longer N−1 reliable under attack. However, overflows can
only occur under contingencies.
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Fig. 6: Physical and cyber RTCA results after re-dispatch.
D. Statistical Results on Attack Consequences
As mentioned at the beginning of Sec. V, we exhaustively
tested attacks targeting the 25 branches with post-contingency
warnings. The designed attacks successfully cause overflows
on 8 out of the 25 target branches. Table I gives the statistical
results on attack consequences of these 8 branches. We derived
attacks using l1-norm constraints in the range from N1 = 0.2
to N1 = 2. The table shows the resulting ranges in maximal
power flow and l0-norm of the attack vector c across this range.
The load shift constraint LS = 10%. The prefix ‘ln’ indicates
a transmission line and ‘tx’ indicates a transformer. From the
maximal power flow range, we can see that some branches
are more vulnerable than others, but most of the overflows
are within 10%. Thus, even when the contingencies occur and
the target branch becomes overloaded, it still takes time for it
to heat up and trip. During this time, the contingencies may
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be eliminated by the system, and no physical damage can
be dealt. Besides, the system operators can identify critical
lines and critical contingencies for attack protection purposes.
For example, they can artificially reduce the line limit to
keep the attack from being successful. Measurements around
vulnerable branches can be encrypted to prevent them from
being modified. In our ADBLP, the load shift constraint
characterizes the detectability of the attack, indicating that load
abnormally detectors can help system operators distinguish
between natural load changes and possible cyber attacks based
on load redistribution.
TABLE I: Statistical Results on Maximal Physical Power
Flow and l0-norm of the Attack Vector with N1 ∈ [0.2, 2]
Target Contingency
Max PF (%) ‖c‖0
N1=0.2 N1=2 N1=0.2 N1=2
ln-6188-7305 ln-7058-7095 101.92 105.08 133 442
ln-6240-6287 ln-6141-6239 102.43 106.76 137 314
ln-7233-7251 tx-6063-6062 105.41 107.90 156 485
ln-1003-1055 ln-3046-3078 102.80 102.94 163 520
ln-2025-2055 ln-2054-5236 107.98 111.00 90 461
ln-2070-5237 ln-2054-5236 101.35 104.35 90 461
ln-1003-1055 ln-1004-3133 102.43 102.56 160 513
ln-7059-7407 ln-7058-7406 100.38 102.24 154 488
VI. CONCLUSION
We have demonstrated that FDI attacks are extremely
limited in their ability to cause physical consequences on
power systems operated by EMSs consisting of SE, RTCA,
and SCED to ensure N − 1 reliability. For such systems, we
showed that attacks designed with only DCOPF as the system
response do not cause expected physical consequences. We
then designed attacks by modeling the worst case attacker that
can mimic the EMS operations including RTCA and SCED,
and tested them on the synthetic Texas system. For this system,
we showed that even for the above-mentioned strong attacker,
the attacks still cannot cause base case overflows, because the
system is pushed to operate conservatively with N−1 reliabil-
ity requirement. The designed attacks can successfully cause
post-contingency overflows on target branches, but it requires
a specific contingency to occur to deal physical damage to the
system. Moreover, the amount of resources required to launch
such attacks is tremendous, and the contingencies can be fixed
before the overloaded lines trip. Therefore, we argue that it is
extremely hard for FDI attacks to cause physical damages to
N − 1 reliable systems. Future work will include designing
countermeasures to detect, identify, and mitigate such attacks,
to further prevent them from damaging the system.
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